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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to collect funds due from the 
State Insurance fund for an industrial accident. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission denied liability and refused 
to pay to the widow of Emmett L. Brown the funds sought under 
the insurance plan. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mrs. Brown seeks a reversal of the decision of the 
Industrial Commission and an award of the proceeds of the 
insurance. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The deceased, Emmett L. Brown, was a Judge in the 
Third Judicial District of the State of Utah from July 1, 
1969, until the time of his death in October 1972. During 
the time of his tenure on the 30th day of May 1971, he 
suffered a heart attack which incapacitated him and took him 
from his work for a period of time. After returning to work 
he commenced first on a part time basis and then on a full 
time, suffering another heart attack on the 31st day of 
August 1972. He never returned to work after that time but 
died as a result of a third heart attack which occured on 
the 17th day of October, 1972. 
The evidence produced at the hearing indicates that 
the time Judge Brown took the bench he was a healthy enthusi-
astic man with no objective evidence whatsoever of heart dis-
ease. Judge Brovm's assignment was to handle matrimonial 
problems which were all grouped under the general heading of 
"Family Court". The nature of the assignment of course was 
to handle divorces, custody matter, inforcement of alimony and 
support payments, etc. Although his health was good at the 
time he entered his office it gradually deteriorated until 
after approximately two years he suffered from the first heart 
attack. Some 15 months later after some recuperation and some 
extensive work he suffered the second heart attack which took 
him off the bench and he never returned. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS 
CONTRARY TO LAW AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The testimony outlined by all the witnesses support . 
the fact that Judge Brown suffered from employment connected 
stress and strain. Particularly, Ivor Boyce, his bailiff 
testified that when Judge Brown was appointed he was very 
enthusiastic. He took his responsibility that the Governor 
had asked him to do and ventured an opinion that two years 
in the Family Court was too long (R.40). He further testified 
that "they just appointed him the senior Judge for the Family 
Court, and he would take care of the whole thing. Then one 
noon hour a week he had a meeting with the Family Services 
which meant that he never did get a lunch at that time. He 
would just work right through. And he took care of the cases 
that the other Judges didn't want to handle. If is was personal 
and such hefd just say 'bring it intf! (R.42). 
Judge Brown would take an average of 15-20 divorces 
a day. His divorce cases were over 300 a month and he took 
care of over 907o of all divorces (R.42). Mr. Boyce further 
testified that Judge Brown was really "up too tight11 before 
his first heart attack. Afterwards it was pressure on him 
because he had been on the Family Court so long it was getting 
to him. He further had nervous tics and twitches of the face 
due to pressure (R.45). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Further testimony of Mr. Boyce indicates that the 
Elwood Dennett case produced more nervous stress and strain 
than at any other time (R.48,49,50). Judge Brown became 
short of temper and changed from the way he had been before. 
Shortly before the time of his first heart attack and just 
before it he seemed to be quite tense and not relaxed (R.51). 
Mr. Brent Nelson, who was the Clerk serving in the 
Brown Court testified that Judge Brown began to undergo changes 
as a result of emotional stress and strain; that the first 
thing he noticed about him as far as the changes were concerned 
was that he became more irritable. In the first instance he 
could listen to a case calmly but later he became irritated 
at the people and their pettiness (R.79). These changes 
occured after about a year on the Bench (R.79). His condition, 
at least in part, was occassioned by the Dennett case which no 
one else would hear (R.81). And there was evidence of extreme 
nervousness after the first heart attack (R.83). 
AuDeane Cowley, a Family Court Counselor duing the 
tenure of the Judge testified that during specific cases you 
could see that Judge Brown was suffering under a lot of stress 
(R.111,112). She further testified that he looked very tired 
and very strained. He looked very troubled over specific cases 
(R. 113) . And indicated that Judge Brown handled between 857o 
and 90% of all custody cases which he was involved (R.115,116). 
That the Judge looked very tired during the last case before 
his second heart attack (R.120). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Don Holladay, Administrator of the Family Court 
during this period of time, testified that between 1969 and 
the first heart attack in 1971, Judge Brown's demeanor changed 
from a gentle even-tempered easy going pleasent person to be 
around to a short tempered, haggard and much less communicative 
person (R.123). Judge Brown told him several times that he 
wanted to get off the Family Court (R.124). 
Dr. Gordon Evans, the personal physician of Judge 
Brown, testified that he had known the Judge for eleven years 
prior to his death, both as a neighbor and in a professional 
capacity. He further testified that he examined his physical 
condition on the 12th of June 1969, prior to his taking the 
Bench. He found no evidence of any heart disease at that time; 
that he was seen periodically thereafter for routine checks 
and that he treated him at the time of the first heart attack 
in May 1971, and also at the time of the second heart attack 
in August and September 1972. 
Dr. Evans obtained the knowledge of the increased 
stress and strain on Judge Brown through conversations and 
obversations (R.134), and further felt that the Judge was under 
an unusual amount of stress because he was so sensitive to the 
needs of the people in Court (R.136). His treatment prescribed 
the elimination of stress (R.137). He saw him at least monthly 
between the two heart attacks. 
Judge Brown, according to the testimony of Dr. Evans, 
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died as a result of thrombosis or soft clot of his anterior 
descending branch of his coronarytor heart arteries which 
stopped the passage of blood into a certain area of the heart 
muscle causing the damage and his death (R.141). Further 
diagnosis of the doctor indicated that the Judge was conscien-
tious about his job and wanted to return quickly; felt an 
obligation to do his part; felt responsibility to do that, all 
of which was in keeping with his personality (R.142) 
Conversations with Judge Brown indicated that he 
wanted to eliminate some of the pressure and change the type 
of job that he was doing and change the assignment as a Judge 
(R.134). He was sensitive in a gentle way to the needs of 
the people and felt that he had a difficult time walking away 
from situations that he saw (R.143). 
In conclusion Dr. Evans indicated that it was a 
generally accepted rule of the medical profession that stress 
can cause aggrevation of almost any kind of underlying disease 
including heart disease (R.143). He further concluded that 
it was his opinion that the presence of stress as described in 
Judge Broxvn brought about aggrevation of his existing disease 
(R.143). The direct question and answer in conclusion were 
as follows: 
Q. "Can you relate the presence of the stressful 
situation that you have described, with the myocardial 
infarction which caused his death?" 
-6~ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. "I would say that stress caused his basic 
underlying disease, which eventually caused his 
myocardial infarction and his death." 
Q. "Are you saying that the stress caused the 
disease?11 
A. "It was a contributing factor in the cause 
of his underlying problem.11 
Further, Dr. Evans testified that the stress that 
was present in Judge Brown as testified by himself and others 
aggrevated the underlying disease and brought about or contrib-
uted to his death (R.158), 
35-1-45 Compensation for Industrial Accidents 
to be paid. Every employee mentioned in Section 
35-1-43 who is injured, and the Defendants of their 
every such employee is killed, by accidents arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, whereso-
ever such injury occured, provided the same was not 
purposely self-inflicted, shall be entitled to receive 
and shall be paid, such compensation for loss sustain-
ed on account of such injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines, 
and, in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, 
as herein provided.11 
"Out of and in the course of the employment" as it 
formerly read before 1919 amendment substituted "or" for "and", 
should be liberally construed. Chandler vs. Industrial Commission 
55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020. 
Both Dr. Evans and Dr. Frank Yanowitz were of the 
opinion that there was a pre-existing coronary difficulty. As 
in the case of Powers vs. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
427 P. 2d 748, this Court announced that aggrevation of a pre-
existing disease by an industrial accident is compensable and 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and that the heart failure brought about by strain in the course 
of the employment may be an accident within the meaning of the 
act. 
Quoting again from the case of Jones vs. California 
Packing Corporation, 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 530: 
"It is settled beyond question that a pre-
existing disease or other distrubed condition or 
defect of the body, when aggrevated or lighted up 
by an industrial accident is compensable under the 
act; also cited: Graybar Electric Company, Inc. vs. 
The Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 568, 276 P.161; 
Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Association vs. Indus-
trial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233. And 
also that an internal failure brought about by 
exertion in the course of employment may be an 
accident within the meaning of Title 42 of the Code 
of 1943, without the requirement that the injury 
result from some incident which happened suddenly 
and is identifiable at a definite time and place. 
Robertson vs. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 25, 
163 P.2d 331; Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Asso-
ciation vs. Industrial Commission; Hammond vs. 
Industrial Commission^ 84 Utah 67~, 3q~P .2d 687; 
Purity Biscuit Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 115 
Utah 1, 201 P.M~961." ' ————^——~ 
In addition, the case of Lumberman's Mutual Casualty 
Company vs. Industrial Accident Commission, 29 Cal. 2d 492, 175 
P.2d 823, supports the proposition that there is no requirement 
of unusual strain. The only showing need be that there be a 
casual connection between the strain of the employment and the 
injuries suffered. This was certainly supported by the testi-
mony of Dr. Evans. Another California case, Fireman's Fund 
Indemnity vs. State Industrial Accident Commission, 39 Cal.2d 
381, 250 P.2d 148, is supportive of the position of the Plaintiff 
-8-
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in that it is sufficient to show that a condition (in this 
case a stroke) can be reached through the cummulative effect 
of each day's strain and it is not necessary to prove the one 
particular exposure to strain and tension was responsible. 
In New York case, Schechter vs. State Insurance Fund, 
160 N.E. 2d 901, a case heard by the Court of Appeals supported 
the claimant's position where he proved the strain occured in 
the usual course of his employment and that the heart attack 
occured at a time when he was engaged in the same general type 
of work in which he was always involved. See also Little vs. 
J. Korber and Company, 71 N.M. 294,378 P.2d 119. 
Although the case In the Matter of the Retirement of 
Horace C. Beck did not reach the Supreme Court the reasoning of 
Judge Croft supports the position that the widoxtf of Judge Brown 
would be entitled to recover hereunder. 
"When we are confronted with the necessity of 
determining the causal connection between disability 
brought on by a heart disease and the performance by 
one's duty, an important element is, it seems to me, 
not so much what caused it, but rather what did not 
cause it. In Judge Beck's case, the only thing that 
seems certain is that we cannot say that his heart 
attack occured as a result of some affirmative act 
on his part that had no connection with his duty as 
a Judge and was in his own doing. We could not 
determine x^ ith any degree of medical certainty all 
of the factors that contributed to the ultimate re-
sult that occured on March 16, 1969. Perhaps no one 
factor "caused11 it. That the tensions and pressures 
of the Judge's duties could be and probably x^ as a 
contributing factor seems evident from Dr. Behren's 
report.ff 
-9-
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a comparison of the medical opinion 
expressed by Dr. Dalrymple in the case of Inga-Lill Elton vs. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137, with 
that of the testimony of Dr. Evans in the instant case revealed 
the following: 
1. In the Elton case (R.91) Dr. Dalrymple testified 
that the underlying disease of Judge Elton could have been 
aggrevated by stress. In the testimony of Dr. Evans (R.143) 
he supports the same proposition that in his opinion the under-
lying condition of Judge Brown was aggrevated by stress. 
2. Dr. Dalrymple expressed his opinion (R.92) that 
the aggrevation hastened his death with the following: 
A. "In my own humble opinion from purely 
historical finding something aggrevated it and 
that seemed to be the principle factor at that 
time.11 
In the Brown case Dr. Evans is much more certain with 
the following answer: 
A. "I would say that the stress caused his basic 
underlying disease, which eventually caused his myo-
cardial infarction and his death"(R.144). 
From the foregoing conclusions of the two doctors we 
can see that the testimony in support of the position of the 
Plaintiff Mrs. Brown is stronger than that in support of the 
decision of Mrs. Elton. This being the case there can be no 
•conclusion that what the trial examiner of the Industrial 
-10-
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Commission failed all objective tests and erred in his conclusion 
that Mrs. Brown is not entitled 'to recover. Accordingly, this 
Court should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission 
and award her the funds from the State Insurance Fund to which 
she is entitled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS M. HAYNIE 
1847 West 2300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Attorney for Appellant 
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